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In December 1982 the Criminal Law Reform Committee presented to the 
Minister of Justice a comprehensive report on bail and made many recom- 
mendations for changes in the current law and practice in this area. 
The primary recommendation of the Committee is that in a majority of 
circumstances there should be a statutory presumption in favour of bail. 
The circumstances in which this presumption will operate and the factors 
to be taken into account in a decision as to whether it is rebutted will be 
discussed in detail later. 
Among the lesser recommendations made are a number aimed at making 
the law on bail more consistent and accessible. The Report envisages that 
any statutory reform should be in the form of a comprehensive Bail Act 
(as is the position in many overseas jurisdictions) and that such a statute 
should cover the vast majority of instances where bail decisions have to be 
made. It is not envisaged that the proposed Act would cover young persons 
(those under 17) where frequently a remand in custody may be made for 
the benefit of the individual in question and not as a necessary part of 
criminal proceedings; nor is it envisaged that immigration cases (involving 
as they do the possibility of deportation, which is a remarkable incentive 
not to attend trial) should be covered by the new statute. However, all 
other bail decisions would be covered by the Act, though on pragmatic 
grounds the Report envisages that there may still be jurisdictional limita- 
tions on the power of the District Courts in cases under the Misuse of 
Drugs Act. The new Act would however, cover both court and police bail. 
and would also fill in the current lacunae which appear to make bail 
unavailable where an appeal to the Privy Council is pending. The Report 
also expresses the view that in any new statute simpler and less technical 
terms should be used so that the procedure may be more readily compre- 
hended by the layman: this bail bonds would be forfeited not estreated. 
Such a change is perhaps long overdue. 
The proposed reforms would not necessarily leave the classifications of 
bailable offences in a much simpler form than they are at present. The 
system envisaged by the Report would retain police bail as a separate type 
of bail subject to rather difIerent criteria from court bail, and would retain 
the distinction between offences bailable as of right and those where the 
individual is bailable only at the discretion of the court, although there 
would. be changes in'detail in each type.of bail covered. 
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The Report envisages that the category of offences bailable as of right 
should be rather broadcned, so that s.319(3) of the Crimes Act would be 
repealed and its curious mixture of offences where bail is available of right 
would disappear. In its place there would be a simpler set of rules. Bail 
would be available as of right where the offence charged is one which does 
not carry a sentence of imprisonment as a possible penalty. Tt would also 
be available as of right to any first offender except where the charge is onc 
carrying more than three years imprisonment as a possible penalty (other 
than charges under s.194 of the Crimes Act - assault by a male on a 
female or assault on a child). However, as is the current position, where 
t l ~  accused is charged with an imprisonable offence and had a prior con- 
viction for an imprisonable oEcnce bail would not be as of right. This 
alone would mean that there has been no significant broadening of the 
availability of bail. It  may well be that other recommendations in this area 
would have the effect of reducing the application of bail as of right as a 
factor in some cases. The Report recommends that even where bail is 
available as of right, the could should have the power to attach "such 
reasonable conditibns as the court considers necessarv to secure that the 
offenders surrenders to custody, does not offend, and does not obstruct the 
course of justice" (para. 138). At present where the offence is bailable 
as of right, there is no power to attach conditions. It  is envisaged that 
where there is a breach of a condition of bail, the defendant be arrested 
and brought before the court and then, even if the offence originally 
charged was one where bail was available as .of right, the decision to 
continue bail would be at the discretion of the court without any presump- 
tion in favour of bail. This may well mean that where there is a substantial 
interval between bail and trial, even those for whom bail was as of right 
may find their liberty jeopardised where it could not now be. 
Where bail is not available as of right, the court will have a discretion 
to grant bail. At all stages prior to conviction, there would be a presumption 
in favour of bail, but this presumption would not apply where either the 
offender has been convicted and seeks bail pending sentence or an appeal, 
or the offender has breached a condition of his bail. 
Police bail is relatively unaffected. The Report envisages that the current 
law allowing release on either a personal bond or without bond but on a 
police summons to attend be retained, and that the police have the power 
to release in all cases other than those of indictable offences not triable 
summarily. The Report also recommends the abolition of the right of the 
police to demand acash deposit, but would allow the retention of sureties 
in police bail (though their total liability should not exceed $500). One 
innovation would be that the police would be entitled to a reporting condi- 
tion where the accused is unlikely to appear in court for some days. The 
presumption in favour of bail which is to apply in the courts is not specific- 
ally carried into police bail, but there is a change (which may in practice 
be only semantic) in that release on bail or summons should be made 
"unless it is imprudent" rather than the current formula of release if it is 
"deemed prudent". Interestingly, the Report envisages the consistency in 
the bail decision as best being achieved by internal police training and 
regulation and thus rejects a right of review by the courts of the police bail 
decision or a need for the police to furnish reasons for not granting bail. A 
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minority of the committee expressed a view that this may place too much 
confidence on the fairness of the police, and certainly it is hoped that there 
will be monitoring of the police decisions to ensure this confidence is not 
misplaced. 
The Report recommends that the courts be specifically empowered to 
prohibit publication of the evidence considered on any bail hearing, and only 
the applicant's name (where not otherwise suppressed), the charges, the 
decision whether or not to grant bail and any conditions attached to bail 
should be publishable unless in special circumstances the court allows fur- 
ther publication. Obviously this is necessary as evidence which is inadmis- 
sible at the trial may be relevant to a bail decision, and it would be pre- 
judicial if such matters could be reported. The Report also envisages that 
there be an express provision that the court, in making any bail decision 
be empowered to receive as evidence any relevant information whether or 
not it would normally be admissible. The Report envisages that in some 
circumstances the court may require the evidence to be on oath, and where 
the defendant elects to give evidence this should later be admissible against 
him only on charges of perjury or where he later gives later testimony 
inconsistent with that given at the bail hearing. 
It is envisaged by the Report that at the bail hearing the Judge shall 
decide the issue on the balance of probabilities, but must give his reasons 
if bail is refused. If bail is granted, the prosecution is entitled to ask for a 
statement of the Judge's reasons. Where conditions are imposed (or are 
varied at a later hearing) reasons need only be furnished if either party 
asks for a statement of them. The furnishing of, or availability of, reasons 
will be a necessary element of the review procedure foreseen as applying 
to bail decisions. The Report envisages that where bail has been refused, 
there shall be a right of the defendant to seek bail again at each remand, 
and the question of bail is then to be determined de novo on each occasion. 
Where it is refused, or is granted subject to conditions, the defendant shall 
have a right to appeal to the High Court by way of original application in 
what is effectively an informal hearing of the case. The prosecution would 
also be able to appeal to the High Court against the granting of bail or to 
seek a variation in the bail conditions. There would be no appeal from 
the High Court decision. Where the defendant has unsuccessfully applied 
to the High Court, and then reappears on remand in the District Court, he 
shall only be able to seek bail where he can point to circumstances not 
before the court on the earlier occasion. Where bail is only available in 
the High Court, either party shall have a right of appeal to the Court of 
Appeal against the decision made. Unlike appeals to the High Court, how- 
ever, these appeals would not be hearings de novo, but would be limited 
to the question of whether the High Court Judge wrongly exercised his dis- 
cretion. Certainly this system should allow for a more rational and speedy 
method of dealing with reviews of bail decision, but there are two matters 
which may be of concern. Since the Report envisages there being a list of 
matters which may rebut the presumption in favour of bail, there may be 
a danger that Judges in refusing bail will steer by the list of criteria in 
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giving their reasons. This may make it difficult for a High Court Judge or 
the Court of Appeal to really review the decision. This may be obviated 
in practice by a convention that such "reasons" are inadequate. There may 
also be problems in establishing what will be sufficient new circumstances 
to justify a fresh approach to the court after bail has been denied by the 
High Court in ite appellate jurisdiction. If the aim is to prevent unnecessary 
applications but to allow reasonable ones to go forward, any limiting pro- 
vision will require extremely careful drafting. 
Inevitably a system of bail must include some sanctions to deal with 
those who do not fulfil their bail obligations. The Report makes several 
recommendations concerning enforcement of bail obligations; alas not 
entirely consistent. In the first place, the Report recommends the widening 
of the power of the police to arrest persons who are in breach of bail 
conditions or are about to abscond. Any police officer would be entitled 
to arrest without warrant any person on bail who absconds or is about to 
abscond or breaches the condition of his bail. A majority recommend 
that the police should also be given powers to arrest those who are reason- 
ably believed to be about to breach the conditions of their bail. The ques- 
tion left unresolved is what is to happen to the persons arrested under this 
last heading. The Report would provide a new sanction for those who 
actually fail to attend their trial, by creating a new summary offence of 
failing to attend trial without reasonable cause. Those who breach bail 
conditions are to be brought before the court and their bail position recon- 
sidered. There does not, however, appear to be any consistency in the 
thinking of the Committee in regard to anticipated breaches of conditions. 
While the actual breach of a condition will not be an offence (para. 140), 
it does displace the presumption in favour of bail, Anticipated breaches 
apparently do not have this effect. The position is then that a person is 
liable to arrest, and may well be kept in custody for some time before 
reappearing, only to have the presumption in favour of his release on bail 
reapplied and possibly to be set at liberty again. It is submitted that unless 
the reasonable grounds for anticipating a breach of a bail condition are 
themselves grounds which would rebut or be relevant to rebutting the 
presumption in favour of release, there should be no power to arrest a 
bailed person merely for anticipated breach of a condition. Unless there is 
such a safeguard, a risk of a trivial breach of a condition may deprive a 
person of his liberty. Such a result should not be contemplated. 
A second method of enforcement is a sanction directed at the offender 
personally. At present there is no power in the courts to demand a cash 
deposit, but the Committee, by a majority, recommend that such deposits 
should be a possibility where there is a serious risk of the defendant 
absconding overseas. In other cases, the sanction directed at the offender 
will be a separate offence of failing to appear for trial, with a punishment 
of half the maximum sentence applicable for the offence for which bail 
was granted. A related offence would be created of failing to answer to 
police bail or a police summons. To facilitate the implementation of such 
an offence, it is recommended that a more adequate bail notice be given to 
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the defendant outlining his position. It is submitted that the Committee is 
correct in recommending against the creation of new odfences of failing to 
comply with bail conditions, since any serious breach of a condition relating 
to the prevention of interference with the accused's trial or of other offend- 
ing will, in itself, be an offence under existing law. 
The third method of enforcement of bail is the surety system. It is envis- 
aged that sureties may be required for both police and court bail, with the 
police approving sureties for police bail, and a Judge, Justice of the Peace, 
Registrar or Deputy Registrar approving court sureties. Where a defendant 
is ordered to find sureties as a condition of bail but cannot do so within 
24 hours, the court is to be obliged to reconsider the condition. Although 
there would not normally be a requirement that a surety post a cash bond, 
the Report recommends that this power be available in exceptional cases 
(e.g. where the surety is normally resident overseas). The duty of the surety 
would be to take all reasonable steps to ensure that the defendant attends 
his trial, and only where this is not done would the surety be liable to 
forfeiture of all or some of his bond. It is suggested that the procedure used 
in the District Courts under s.57 and s.58 of the Summary Proceedings Act 
is the appropriate system for use in all courts. The Report specifically 
notes (para.173) that it would be unduly onerous on the surety to ensure 
compliance with bail conditions other than attendance at trial. This may 
be doubted - there may well be some occasions on which it is not par- 
ticularly onerous, and if the aim of the bail system is to allow liberty of the 
defendant while facing a criminal charge, the interests of the state should 
also be served by preserving the obligations of sureties at as high a level 
as is feasible. If the test of the surety's duty is to take all reasonable steps 
to prevent a breach of bail conditions, the court is or should be able to 
decide whether the surety has taken reasonable steps in regard to any 
particular condition. The more onerous it was for him to supervise that 
condition, the less the standard of care required. If the condition was easily 
supervised, the surety can reasonably be expected to supervise it. Perhaps 
this point may be reconsidered when the proposed Act is drafted. 
The greatest departure from the existing law envisaged by the Report is 
the recommendation that there be a presumption in favour of bail in almost 
all cases. As noted earlier, the presumption would not apply where the 
defendant had been brought before the court after a breach of existing bail 
conditions, and it would also cease to operate where the defendant has beell 
convicted and seeks to remain at liberty pending sentence or appeal. In 
these cases bail would be at the discretion of the court. Apart from these 
instances, and those where bail is available as of right, the presumption 
would operate regardless of the nature of the offence. Even where the pre- 
sumption in favour of release on bail is rebutted, the court will have a 
residual discretion to grant bail. 
The Report postulates rebuttal of the presumption where there are 
reasonable grounds to believe that the offender may not appear for trial, 
may commit further offences while on bail, or may interfere with the 
course of justice. In deciding this, the court should have regard to a number 
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of [actors including the nature and seriousness of the offence charged, the 
penalty likely to be imposed on the charge, the defendant's prior criminal 
history (if any), the defendant's record in respect of prior grants of bail - 
including, as a separate ground, the fact that the offence in question was 
allegedly committed while on bail, the strength of the evidence against the 
defendant and the accused's family circumstances and other relevant per- 
sonal circumstances such as his employment position. 
I f  the court is satisfied that the presumption is rebutted, then it is to 
consider whether the discretion it has should be exercised in favour of the 
defendant nevertheless. The Report (para. 79) envisages as relevant at 
this later stage such matters as the potential delay in the matter of coming 
to trial, the health of the accused, the preparation of his defence and the 
effects that custody may have on his employment or his family. Whether 
such factors will in practice serve to overweigh judicial caution may be 
doubted. It certainly is not unlikely that in the majority of cases, the fact 
that the presumption is held to have been rebutted will lead to the con- 
clusion that the risk of placing the defendant at liberty is unjustified. 
On a more general view, it appears that the logical basis of the sugges- 
tion for a rebuttable presumption and the factors which can rebut the 
presumption is not as sound as it should be. It is a notable feature of the 
Report that there is little if any consideration of the philosophical basis for 
bail. In essence the Report takes the view that the existing considerations in 
a bail decision must be continued, without discussing their bases. If, as the 
Report postulates, there are four circumstances which justify pre-trial deten- 
tion, with its attendant infringement of personal liberty, in the interests of 
society, one would expect those circumstances to be critically evaluated to 
see whether there is in fact such a justification. These four circumstances 
are that bail may be refused where the defendant is mentally disturbed and 
detention is required for his or society's protection or for evaluation of his 
mental state where this cannot be done while he is at liberty; where the 
defendant is unlikely to appear for trial; where the defendant may interfere 
with the course of his trial by tampering wtih evidence, witnesses or the 
jury; and where there is a risk of further offending while the defendant is 
awaiting trial. These circumstances are not necessarily linked logically. The 
detention of the mentally disturbed is a relatively rare case, and can be 
justified both as protecting society and in terms of the "paternal" power 
of the state. It is clearly tenable as a ground. The second and third circum- 
stances are linked in that they concern the overall interests of justice - 
the opportunity of the state to have a chance to prove properly the guilt of 
the accused. In such circumstances, pre-trial detention may be justified. 
However, the fourth circumstance, the risk of future offending is not so 
easily justifiable. In substances it is a form of preventive detention. Surely 
more is needed to justify the denial or liberty of an individual who may 
or may not commit offences than the statement that "Respect for the law 
suffers where offences are committed by persons on bail" (Report, para. 
10). No one has (yet) suggested doing away with parole because some 
parolees commit offences while on parole. If a bailed defendant commits 
further offences, he should be punished for those after due trial. The cases 
where preventive detention might be justified can be subsumed under other 
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justifiable heads. If it is feared the original alleged victim will be in jeo- 
pardy, there is a threat to a witness - and this comes under the protection 
of the due course of justice. If there is a risk of indiscriminate violent 
offending, there may be a case for a more general ground of protecting 
society, but such a ground needs careful definition. It is certainly not suffi- 
cient to leave a general risk of further offending as a ground for restricting 
individual liberty. The Report does foresee difficulties for the courts in 
deciding whether there is a sufficient risk of serious offending as a matter 
relevant to the exercise of their discretion. But this may be too late in the 
process. The risk of serious harm to some person, particularly to the 
original victim, may be a ground for rebutting the presumption in favour of 
libety, but a general risk of offending should not be. There is a similarity 
with the limitation of bail as of right to first offenders - where bail is not 
as of right where offences under s.194 of the Crimes Act are charged 
because of the domestic nature of many such incidents and the fear of 
repetition. The fear of repetition to the same victims is clearly the basis of 
such a provision. A similar distinction ought to be drawn in the wider field 
where bail is only available as of right. 
Criticism can also be made of the same matters relevant to deciding 
whether the presumption is rebutted. The seven factors specified to be 
relevant are not all justifiable. The nature of the offence, the probable 
penalty in the event of conviction and the strength of the case against him 
are clearly relevant to deciding whether it is likely the defendant might 
abscond rather than face trial, conviction or sentence. The defendant's 
prior history, if any, in respect of grants of bail may also indicate whether 
he is likely to surrender to his bail, and his family ties etc. are clearly 
matters to be taken into account in assessing the degree of risk attributed 
to the earlier factors. But there must be doubt as to the remaining two 
specified considerations. The stipulation that it is relevant that the defendant 
is charged with an offence allegedly committed while already on bail ought 
only to be relevant where firstly the court can justifiably override the pre- 
sumption of innocence on a criminal charge (in that otherwise there is 
effectively detention because of the repetition of allegations of offending, 
without conviction on any charge) and the offence is one where the state 
has a right to intervene either to protect the interests of justice or of 
threatened parties such as the victim of the alleged first offence. A general 
rule that the charge is one of an offence committed while on bail seems 
unduly wide. Criticism can also be directed at the requirement that the 
courts take into account the prior criminal history of the defendant. 
Although such prior history is usually relevant to sentencing, it ought only 
to be relevant to the decision relating to bail where the prior history is 
such that it shows a serious likelihood of absconding (e.g. where the 
delendant will be likely to receive a lengthy term of imprisonment because 
of his prior history) or where it indicates a risk of interfering with the 
course of justice. This may be the intention of the Report, but it is to be 
hoped that any statute will make it clear that prior criminal history is only 
of this limited relevance. It may also be doubted whether the addition of a 
catch-all provision of "any other relevant factors" increases the clarity of 
the proposed tests. 
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Although this writer has been critical of some of the detail of the pro- 
posed reform, and the implementation of it may require attention to be 
given to certain matters, it is undoubtedly capable of giving rise to a far 
more coherent and balanced law of bail than we currently have. The 
inclusion of the presumption in favour of bail, if it is preserved and 
observed, indicates a desirable shift in favour of preserving the rights of 
the accused person who has not yet been convicted. If nothing more comes 
from the Report than a recognition that these rights are not properly pro- 
tected at present, the Report will have been a most valuable document. 
The scheme for the review of bail decisions may also, if adequate reasons 
are insisted on, allow for a relatively equitable and speedy procedure. It is 
to be hoped that the Government will see fit to include bail reform in its 
legislative programme in the near future; and that the strong points in the 
Report are not reduced or removed to demonstrate the Government's 
apparent wish to be seen as "getting tough" with those involved in the 
criminal justice system. 
